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This dissertation includes three essays on strategic experimentation. In Chapter 
2, we investigate a game of strategic experimentation that also appears in Bolton 
and Harris (1999). The setting is a two-player continuous-time two-armed bandit 
problem. We will show that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium and that there 
are only two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, both of which are simple in 
nature. In so doing, it will be shown that this game is a kind of simple coordination 
game. We will also show that the asymmetric equilibria are robust for a wide range   ix 
of parameters against the perturbations in the noise structure. Based on this result, 
we argue that even in the symmetric game with a homogeneous noise structure, the 
focus of the analysis should be on the asymmetric equilibria, not on the symmetric 
equilibrium that was studied in Bolton and Harris (1999). 
In Chapter 3, we will investigate the possibility that the inefficiency in Chapter 
2 could be overcome by market competition. Two competing firms are now 
supplying the two options. It will be shown that results vary according to whether 
or not consumers are homogeneous. If all the consumers have the same abilities to 
evaluate the uncertain product, it is possible to achieve the efficient outcome. If the 
consumers have heterogeneous abilities, then it is impossible to achieve the 
efficient outcome.  
In Chapter 4, we turn to discrete-time models. Unlike continuous-time set up, 
we can provide a general model of multi-player multi-armed bandit problems in 
discrete-time set up. Under the assumption of perfect observability, we will 
generalize Section 2.2 in Berry and Fristedt (1985) to n player case. Then, we will 
show that there exist pure Markov strategy equilibria. Chapter 1
Introduction
In a standard undergraduate textbook of microeconomics, the only mention
of uncertainty is found in the chapter covering expected utility theory. Consumers
are assumed to know exactly how much utility they will get from the consumption
of each good. No matter how subtle the di¤erences among the goods we assume,
a consumer will understand them perfectly. Producers perceive market demands
exactly. We even take this a step forward in the theory of duopoly in which each
… r mi sa s s u m e dt ok n o wt h eo t h e r… r m ’ sc o s tf u n c t i o na sw e l l .
In reality, however, almost nothing is known for sure. No …rm has perfect
knowledge of the market demand function. No consumer knows fully all the minute
di¤erences of di¤erentiated products in the market. This lack of full knowledge is
a fundamental aspect of human life.
1What is perhaps more important, but often overlooked, is that we obtain
additional information almost every time we make an economic decision. A con-
sumer who buys an apple at a supermarket will get some information about the
taste of the speci…c kind of apple he decides to purchase. The owner of a gas
station will obtain information about the local market demand for gas as he posts
the price of gas each day. This newly acquired information will then have e¤ects
on the decisions of the consumer and of the owner of the gas station in the future.
If the taste of the apple was very bad, the consumer may decide not to purchase
that type of apple in the future. Depending on the sales record today, the owner
of the gas station may want to increase or decrease the gas price tomorrow. These
decisions, of course, may bring additional information which will in turn a¤ect
future decisions.
In some situations, people may act primarily to get information. If a con-
sumer …nds a new strain of apple in the supermarket, and if he never knew that
type of apple exists before he entered the supermarket, he may decide to purchase
it primarily to gain information about the new variety. At the cost of his favorite
apple from which he could expect to get certain amount of joy, he is going to
gather information about the new kind of apple. In other situations, the trade o¤
between the acquisition of information and the sacri…ce of the instant reward may
be less explicit and subtler. This trade o¤ between information and instant reward
2is fundamental. Thus, in order to understand various economic phenomena better,
it is crucial to understand how a rational person experiments to get information.
Multi-armed bandit theory studies this issue in a most abstract form: Sup-
pose we ought to select sequentially one of k alternatives. If the payo¤s of those
k alternatives are known only probabilistically, then what would be an optimal
strategy to maximize the sum of the payo¤s?
Some immediate applications of bandit problems are simplest search prob-
lems. It is, however, not appropriate in general to attempt to apply the results
of bandit problems to economic analysis directly. In multi-armed bandit prob-
lems which are one person decision problems, the possibility of the existence of
other experimenters, which is a usual feature in economic problems, is ignored. If
there are other people, their experimentation may also provide opportunities to
get information. Except in the case of Robinson Crusoe on a deserted island, we
can always get some information which is relevant to our decisions by observing
others’ decisions and the results of those decisions. If the owner of the gas station
sees the owner of a nearby gas station post a higher price than his and observes
that the number of cars stopping by that station for fuel still does not decrease
and that the number of cars stopping by his station does not increase either, then
he would increase his price the next day. Even Robinson Crusoe can learn from
the experience of his cohabitant, Friday. Since experimentation is costly, people
3will take advantage of the opportunity to observe others and to learn from their
experimentation so as to lower their own costs of experimentation at the expense
of others.
Analysis of equilibria in an environment in which experimentation decisions
are made strategically is new to economists, and there is not much research in
this area. The very …rst, and perhaps most challenging, question is how to keep
track of people’s beliefs as they are updated with newly acquired information.
The most general answer to this question, and hence, the full understanding of
the issue of strategic experimentation, are not yet obtained. Nevertheless, we will
keep collecting pebbles on the beach of this newly found ocean, and provide in this
dissertation some that we have found.
Outlines
In Chapter 2, we investigate a game of strategic experimentation that also
appears in Bolton and Harris (1999). The setting is a two-player continuous-
time two-armed bandit problem. We will show that there is no mixed strategy
equilibrium and that there are only two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, both
of which are simple in nature. In so doing, it will be shown that this game is a
kind of simple coordination game. We will also show that the asymmetric equilibria
are robust for a wide range of parameters against the perturbations in the noise
4structure. Based on this result, we argue that even in the symmetric game with a
homogeneous noise structure, the focus of the analysis should be on the asymmetric
equilibria, not on the symmetric equilibrium that was studied in Bolton and Harris
(1999).
In Chapter 3, we will investigate the possibility that the ine¢ciency in Chap-
ter 2 could be overcome by market competition. Two competing …rms are now
supplying the two options. It will be shown that results vary according to whether
or not consumers are homogeneous. If all the consumers have the same abilities
to evaluate the uncertain product, it is possible to achieve the e¢cient outcome.
If the consumers have heterogeneous abilities, then it is impossible to achieve the
e¢cient outcome.
In Chapter 4, we turn to discrete-time models. Unlike continuous-time set
up, we can provide a general model of multi-player multi-armed bandit problems
in discrete-time set up. Under the assumption of perfect observability, we will
generalize Section 2.2 in Berry and Fristedt (1985) to n player case. Then, we will
show that there exist pure Markov strategy equilibria.
5Chapter 2
Robust Equilibria in Strate-
gic Experimentation
2.1 Introduction
In a recent paper analyzing strategic experimentation, Bolton and Harris
(1999) found a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and examined its properties.
However, it can be shown that their equilibrium is extremely fragile with respect
to perturbations in the noise structure. By contrast, the asymmetric equilibria
they did not analyze are robust to these perturbations. After characterizing all
equilibria in the two-player game, we will argue that the main focus of analysis
6ought to be on asymmetric equilibria.
The game we consider is a variation of the two-player continuous-time bandit
problem. Each player should divide their time between two options; one of which
is “safe” and the other “risky.” If the safe option is chosen, the player will be
rewarded at a known rate. If the risky one is chosen, the player who chooses it
will obtain a payo¤ which is a sum of the reward from the unknown parameter
and noise. Thus, the reward rate for the risky option is unknown, which could
be higher or lower than that of the safe one, and it should be learned over time.
We assume that all the previous actions of each player and the realizations of the
noisy payo¤s are known to each player at all times. Therefore, each player will get
information about the unknown reward rate of the risky option not only from her
own experimentation, but also from that of the other player.
The main di¤erence between our model and that in Bolton and Harris (1999)
is in our assumption that the noise from the risky option could have di¤erent
variances across individuals. To be speci…c, without loss of generality, ¾2; the
variance of the noise added to the payo¤ from the risky option to player 2, will be
smaller than ¾1; the variance of the noise added to the payo¤ from the risky option
to player 1. This perturbed game will serve to test the robustness of equilibria of
the original game in Bolton and Harris (1999), where they assumed homogeneity
of the noise structure.
7This model is important to understand, since a lot of situations …t the de-
scription of “strategic experimentation.” Examples include natural resource ex-
ploration, adoption of new institution, technologies, or products, research and de-
velopment, and consumer search. None of these examples will be as simple as our
model. Overall, however, we agree with Bolton and Harris (1999) that multi-agent
two-armed bandit problem will be the backbone of multi-agent active learning
theories. The depth of the current understanding of this problem, however, is not
satisfactory. Thus, as a way of attaining a better understanding, we con…ne our
focus to the 2 player case, and attempt to do full analysis. The basic results are
as follows.
We …rst show that in addition to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria
Bolton and Harris (1999) investigated, the original game has two more equilibria,
which are asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. In every perturbed game, however,
there are only two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. There is no mixed strategy
equilibrium in perturbed game. The structures of the asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria are very simple; either player 1 is experimenting more or player 2 is. To
explain this in more detail, let p be the posterior probability that the risky option
has a higher reward rate. Then, at one equilibrium, there will be two cuto¤ points
0 <c 1 <c 2 < 1 such that player 1 chooses the risky option if and only if p>c 1
and player 2 chooses the risky one if and only if p>c 2: At the other equilibrium,
8there still are two cuto¤s 0 <c 0
1 <c 0
2 < 1, but now, player 1 and 2 choose the risky
option if and only if p>c 0
2 and p>c 0
1; respectively.
Moreover, by showing that the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium disap-
pears as soon as we add heterogeneity into the structure of the noise, and that, by
contrast, the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are robust against this pertur-
bations, we select the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria against the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium in the original game. More precisely, in all pure strat-
egy equilibria, the length of the interval of p on which only one of the players is
experimenting is shown to be bounded away from zero as ¾2 converges to ¾1:
Some features of these asymmetric equilibria are worth emphasizing. As
the experimentation of player 2 will provide more accurate information than that
of player 1 does, social optimality requires that player 2 should choose the risky
option in case only one of them experiments. There exists, however, an equilibrium
at which the player with noisier signal chooses the risky option earlier, which is
opposite to the e¢cient allocation. It will be shown that even the equilibrium
where player 2 begins to choose the risky option …rst is ine¢cient due to the free
riding incentives. At both asymmetric equilibria, players will cease to select the
risky option for some beliefs even though social optimality requires there to be
experimentation. Hence, we have too little experimentation for these beliefs, and
thus too little social learning. The ex ante probability of adopting the better
9product is less than optimal.
Lastly, it will be shown that the perturbed game is a kind of coordination
game. Depending on which type of equilibria they are playing, the payo¤ to each
player will be determined accordingly. For example, if player 1 is doing more
experimentation and player 2 is free riding, then the payo¤ to player 2 is greater
than that of player 1.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game. Section 3
summarizes the basic results that will be useful in later sections. All the results in
Section 3 are straightforward modi…cations of those in Bolton and Harris (1999).
The team problem is studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we show that the structure
of the equilibrium strategy pro…le in our model is fairly simple. We show this
in three steps. Firstly, it will be shown that there is no symmetric equilibrium.
Second, we prove a characterization lemma for mixed strategy equilibria. Lastly, by
showing that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium that satis…es this condition,
we show that the only possible equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium. In
Section 6, we provide one characterization theorem for pure strategy equilibria
pro…les, and with it, we show that asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are robust
to perturbations in ¾2; given ¾1. In Section 7, it is shown that the game we analyze
is simply a coordination game. The player engaged in less experimentation receives
a higher payo¤. The existence proof of asymmetric equilibria is given in Section 8.
102.2 The Model
There are 2 in…nitely lived, risk-neutral players who will be denoted by 1;2.
At each time period [t;t + dt), each player has to decide how to allocate her time
between two alternatives, one of which is safe and the other risky. Their choices
are made simultaneously and independently. For player i =1 ;2; if she devotes a








from the safe option, and the total payo¤
d¼
1




from the risky option.
We assume that 1) s is known to both players, 2) neither of players knows ¹;
although the value of ¹ is …xed, 3) ¹ can be either h or l; where 0 <l<s<h ;4)
the dZk
i (t) are the independent standard Brownian motions for k 2f 0;1g;i=1 ;2:
Thus, by choosing the risky option, each player could get information about ¹,
although this information is subject to noise.
Since the dZk
i (t) a r es t a n d a r dB r o w n i a nm o t i o n s ,dZk
i (t) will be distributed
following normal distribution whose mean and variance are zero and dt; respec-
tively. This implies that d¼0
i is distributed normally with mean (1 ¡ ®i)sdt and
variance (1 ¡ ®i)¾2dt; and that d¼1
i is distributed with mean ®i¹dt and variance
11®i¾2
idt: Regarding the variances of the noise, we will assume that they will be
di¤erent across players. This assumption implies that the signals received by the
two players will di¤er in quality. Without loss of generality, we will assume that
0 <¾ 2 <¾ 1: The signal for player 2 will be less noisy. We could interpret this as-
sumption as each player having di¤erent technologies to evaluate the true value of
the risky option. All the players have the same objective: to maximize the present





r is the common discount factor for the players. The meaning of this expectation
will be clearer in the next section.
We will assume that each player’s decision and her payo¤ in each period,
(®i(t);¼0
i(t);¼1
i(t))i=1;2 ; will be known to everyone at the beginning of the preceding
period. Thus, f(®i(t);¼ 0
i(t);¼ 1
i(t))i=1;2gt<~ t are common knowledge to the players
at time ~ t; for all ~ t:
2.3 Basic Results1
Most of the results in this section are straightforward modi…cations of those
in Bolton and Harris(1999).
1 All the results in this section can be generalized in a straight forward way to the
game of N players, where 0 <¾ N < :::: < ¾1:
122.3.1 The Filtering Problem
Following Bolton and Harris(1999), we will focus only on the perfect equilibria
in stationary Markov strategies. Hence the properties of p; the posterior probability
of ¹ being h; which is the natural state variable in our model, are important for
our analysis.
Suppose player i devotes the proportion ®i of the current period [t;t + dt)
to the risky option; and let p(t) be the prior probability that ¹ is h at time t; and
p(t+dt) be the posterior at the end of the current period. Let dp(t)=p(t+dt)¡p(t):
We need to characterize the distribution of dp(t): This problem is usually called a
…ltering problem.
Proposition 2.1 Conditional on the information available to players at time
t, the change in beliefs dp(t) is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance
(®1=¾2
1 + ®2=¾2
2)©(p(t))dt; where ©(p)=[ p(1 ¡ p)(h ¡ l)]2:
Proof . Since players derive the information about ¹ only from d¼1
i(t); these
payo¤s are observationally equivalent to the signals d~ ¼1
i =( ®i)1=2~ ¹i+dZ1
i (t); where
~ ¹i = ¹=¾i: Note that ~ ¹i takes the values ~ li = l=¾i or ~ hi = h=¾i with probabilities
(1 ¡ p) and p: Therefore, applying Bayes’ Rule,
p(t + dt)=
p(t)F(~ h1;~ h2)
p(t)F(~ h1;~ h2)+( 1¡ p(t))F(~ l1;~ l2)
;
13where F(~ ¹1; ~ ¹2)=( 2 ¼dt)¡1 expf¡(1=2dt)
P2
i=1(d~ ¼1
i(t)¡(®i)1=2~ ¹idt)2g is the prob-
ability of observing the payo¤ pro…le d~ ¼1(t)=
Q2
i=1 d~ ¼1
i(t) given (~ ¹1; ~ ¹2): Hence,
dp = p(t + dt) ¡ p(t)
=
p(1 ¡ p)( ~ F(~ h1;~ h2) ¡ ~ F(~ l1;~ l2))
p ~ F(~ h1;~ h2)+( 1¡ p) ~ F(~ l1;~ l2)
;






idtg; a n dw eh a v es u p -
pressed the dependence of variables on t: Note that



































w h e r ew eh a v ed r o p p e dt h et e r m so fo r d e rdt3=2 and higher, and where we have
used the fact that (d~ ¼1
i)2 = dt and d~ ¼1
id~ ¼1
j =0if i 6= j; respectively. Hence,
dp =






i=1(®i)1=2 ~ mi(p)d~ ¼1
i











1=2 ~ mi(p)d~ ¼
1
i)



















where ~ mi(p)=[ ( 1¡ p)l + ph]=¾i; and d ~ Z1
i = d~ ¼1
i ¡ (®i)1=2((1 ¡ p)l + ph)dt: We
have used again the fact that (d~ ¼1
i)2 = dt and d~ ¼1
id~ ¼1
j =0if i 6= j; respectively,




standard 2-dimensional Wiener process. Therefore, dp has mean 0 and variance




This proposition explains the main reason we are using continuous-time
model. In discrete-time model, it is di¢cult to describe the posterior beliefs in
at r a c t a b l ew a y .
From Proposition 2.1, we can see that ©(0) = ©(1) = 0: Therefore, once they
become sure about ¹; from that point on, there will be no further change in p;
which is a common feature of Bayesian updating. Also, players’ decision ®i’s have
weighted e¤ects on the variance of dp(t); and these weights are the inverses of ¾2
i:
Hence, the more accurate player i’s signal is, the greater will be the in‡uence of
the proportion of his time spent on the risky option on the variance of dp(t):
2.3.2 Properties of The Value Function
Our primary interest in this paper is in Markov perfect equilibria. Therefore,
we will not attempt to de…ne the set of strategies for each player rigorously, and
move directly to Markov strategies. A Markov strategy is a strategy dependent
only on p; which is our natural state variable in this model.
De…nition 2.2 A Markov strategy is a measurable function from [0;1] to
15[0;1]:
Since p(t) has a well-de…ned distribution, and since we are considering only





in the previous section is well-de…ned.
Let Mi be the set of Markov strategies for player i: Given any notation with
subscript, such as ai; following convention, we will denote a3¡i by a¡i for i =1 ;2:
De…nition 2.3 As t r a t e g yp r o … l es =( s1;s 2) is a Nash equilibrium if si is a
best response for player i against s¡i for all i =1 ;2: As t r a t e g yp r o … l e» =( »1;»2)
is a subgame perfect Markov equilibrium if » is a Nash equilibrium and »i
i saM a r k o vs t r a t e g yf o ra l li =1 ;2:
Henceforth, we will simply call a Markov strategy a strategy except where
there is risk of confusion.
Let m(p)=ph+(1¡p)l be the myopic expected payo¤ from the risky option
when ¹ is believed to be h with probability p: Then, player i’s value function,
when the other player’s strategy is »¡i; will be the unique solution of the Hamilton-
16Jacobi-Bellman equation2
ui(p)= m a x
0·®i·1


















Thus, as in discrete-time dynamic programming equation, player i’s value function
will be sum of two parts. Firstly, (1¡®i)s+®im(p) is the instant expected payo¤
















is the discounted expected value of the changes in ui: As in the discrete-time case,
given this dynamic programming formulation, a strategy »i will be a best response
to »¡i if and only if
»i 2 arg max
0·®i·1


















for all p 2 [0;1]:
Since
ui(p)= m a x
0·®i·1





























2 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is the dynamic programming equation in continuous-










¡ (s ¡ m(p))
¶
g;











2 [0;1] if (1=(r¾2
i))©(p)u00
i(p)=2=s ¡ m(p):
The above result has an immediate interpretation. s¡m(p) will be the oppor-
tunity cost of choosing the risky option for player i; while (1=(r¾2
i))©(p)u00
i(p)=2
measures the informational gain from her experimentation. Thus, player i will
choose the risky option or the safe one depending on whether or not the informa-
tional gain outweighs the opportunity cost.
We will characterize properties of player i’s value function, which will be
useful for our analysis. Let u(p)=m a x fs; m(p)g, which is a myopic payo¤, let
u(p)=( 1¡p)s+ph, which is the full-information ex-ante payo¤, and let b be the
myopic break-even point such that m(b)=s:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that player i plays a best response to the strategy
pro…le »¡i: Let ui be her value function. Then u · ui · u and u00
i ¸ 0 on [0;1]:
In particular, u00
i(b) > 0:
Proof . Since one possible strategy for her is to choose the safe option when
p 2 [0;b] and the risky one when p 2 (b;1];u· ui is clearly true. Also since any
strategy for her in incomplete information case will be also a strategy in complete
18information case, ui · u is immediate. For the second part, note that the Bellman
equation (2.1) holds if and only if























with at least one equality.













Similarly, if the second inequality holds as an equality and »¡i=¾2












If the second inequality holds as an equality and »¡i=¾2
¡i =0 ; then ui = s: Since
ui ¸ s on [0;1];u i attains a minimum in this case, and hence u00
i ¸ 0: Therefore,
overall, u00
i ¸ 0 on [0;1]:
Lastly, suppose u00
i(b)=0 : Then, by (2.1) again, ui(b)=u(b): With the …rst
part of this Lemma, however, this implies that ui h a sa nu p w a r dk i n ka tp = b;
which is a contradiction to the fact that u is continuously di¤erentiable for all
p 2 [0;1]. Hence u00
i(b) > 0:
It is easy to prove the following proposition using Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.5 Player i’s value function ui is a non-decreasing, convex
19function.
Proof . Since u00
i ¸ 0; convexity is trivial. Since ui(0) = s; and since u(p) ¸ s
for all p 2 [0;1] from Proposition 2.4, it is also clear that ui is non-decreasing.
If p = b; then each player will be myopically indi¤erent between the safe
option and the risky one. By choosing the risky one, however, in addition to
the instant payo¤s, they could also get extra information about the risky option.
Therefore, choosing the risky option is a dominant strategy for each player if p ¸ b:
Proposition 2.6 If, for player i; »i is a best response to »¡i for some »¡i 2
M¡i; then for all p 2 [b;1];» i(p)=1 :
The following lemma which says that the payo¤ for player i will not decrease
if the opponent will increase her experimentation can be proved using the fact that
u00
i ¸ 0; and it will be useful when we prove the existence of equilibrium in Section
8.
Proposition 2.7 Let »¡i and ^ »¡i be strategy pro…les of the other player, and
let ui and ^ ui be the value functions of player i when she plays a best response to
»¡i and ^ »¡i; respectively. If »¡i ¸ ^ »¡i; then ui ¸ ^ ui:
20Proof . The value function ui satis…es the Bellman equation
ui(p)= m a x
0·®i·1



































Comparing the inequality with the Bellman equation for ^ ui
^ ui(p)= m a x
0·®i·1
















from the positivity of the Bellman operator, we conclude that ui ¸ ^ ui:
2.4 The Team Problem
As a benchmark for our equilibrium analysis, we will investigate the team
problem …rst. Since the two players will have signals of di¤erent quality, if social
optimality requires only one of them to select the risky option, we would naturally
conjecture that player 2 should select it. Indeed, at the socially optimal allocation,
there will be two cuto¤s 0 <c 2 <c 1 < 1 such that player i will choose the risky
option if and only if p 2 (ci;1]: In this section, we will prove this result.
In the team problem, a social planner will maximize the average payo¤ of
the two players. Hence,
21Lemma 2.8 The value function u¤ for the team problem is the unique solution
of the Bellman equation



































































































Since 0 <¾ 2 <¾ 1 by assumption, it is clear that if f»ig is optimal, then
f»ig =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 for all i =1 ;2 if (1=(r¾2
2))©u00
¤=2 < (s ¡ m)=2
1 for i =2 ; and 0 for i =1
if (1=(r¾2
2))©u00




1 for all i =1 ;2 if (1=(r¾2
1))©u00
¤=2 > (s ¡ m)=2;
22where we suppress the dependence of ©;u 00
¤; and m on p:
Hence the structure of the optimal policy of this problem is very simple. In
general, there will be two cuto¤ points 0 <c 2 <c 1 < 1=c0 so that if p 2 (c1;1];
then both of the players should select the risky option, if p 2 (c2;c 1]; only player 2
ought to select the risky one, and if p 2 [0;c 2]; then both should select the safe one.
This structure of the optimal policy is fairly intuitive. We can interpret (s¡m(p))=2
as the common opportunity cost for choosing the risky option. Therefore, all the
players are facing the same conditions regarding cost. The di¤erences in quality
of signals, however, will give them di¤erent bene…ts from experimentation, which
is (1=(r¾2
i))©(p)u00
¤(p)=2; and therefore, they will have di¤erent break-even points.
Social optimality requires that, unless they are too pessimistic or too optimistic,
only player 2 experiment.
With this structure of the optimal policy in mind, we now know that for


















for j =0 ;1: Of course, if p 2 [0;c 2]; then u¤ = s:
















is the general solution of this di¤erential equation for p 2 (c2;c 1]: For p 2 (c1;1];














To obtain the …nal solution, we need to specify 2 cuto¤ points c1;c 2 in addition to
the 3 parameters, (¯0;¯1;¯2); a n dt h e yw i l lb ed e t e r m i n e db yb o u n d a r yc o n d i t i o n s
which include value matching conditions and smooth pasting conditions.3
Let u¤(p) over (cj+1;c j] be u¤j(p) for j =0 ;1: Then the value matching
conditions will be
u¤0(c1)=u¤1(c1); and u¤1(c2)=s:








Since we have …ve parameters to determine, we need one more boundary condition,
and the following theorem provides it.
3 For an introductory explanation for these conditions, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Ch.4.






Proof . In the following proof, we will extend the domains of u¤0 and u¤1 to












for all p 2 (c1;1]; and since u00
¤0 and u00










for all p 2 (c1 ¡ ";c1 + "); which is contradictory to the optimality of »1 =0for
p 2 [0;c 1]:
Suppose u00
¤1(c1) <u 00




















We …rst show that it is impossible to have the second inequality above hold with








































as p % c1: Since u00
¤1(c1) <u 00





































¤0(c1) altogether imply that there exists "0 > 0
such that u¤0(p) >u ¤1(p) for all p 2 (c1 ¡ "0;c 1): This, however, contradicts the
optimality for player 1 of ceasing to choose the risky option if p · c1.
It is notable that u00
¤1(c1)=u00
¤0(c1) implies that, when the social planner
a l l o c a t e sp l a y e r1 ’ st i m e ,s h eo u g h tt ob ei n d i ¤ e r e n tb e t w e e nt h es a f eo p t i o na n d
the risky one at p = c1. This could also be shown as following by invoking a
stopping time, which will show more clearly that this boundary condition comes
from the fact that p(t) follows Brownian motion. We will show that the social
planner can’t strictly prefer player 1 choosing the safe option at p = c2: The
argument for the other case is similar.
Suppose so. Let ¿1 be a stopping time which is induced from »i; adapted
26to an obvious …ltration, and indicates the …rst time player 1 will choose the risky
option assuming that p(0) 2 (c1;c 2): Let t1 b et h e… r s tt i m es u c ht h a tp(t1)=c1:
Because of the path properties of Brownian motion, for any ">0; Pr(p(t) >c 1 for
some t1 <t<t 1 + "jp(t1)=c1)=1 : Therefore, Pr(¿1 <t 2 + "j¿>t 2)=1for all
">0: This implies, however, that Pr(¿ · t2j¿>t 2)=1 , which is a contradiction.
From this, it follows immediately that all the parameters are uniquely deter-
mined.
Theorem 2.10 At the optimal solution of the team problem, there will be two
cuto¤ points 0 <c 2 <c 1 < 1 so that
»1(p)=
(
0i f p 2 [0;c 1]
1i f p 2 (c1;1]
; and »2(p)=
(
0i f p 2 [0;c 2]
1i f p 2 (c1;1]
:
The two cuto¤ points c1 and c2 will be unique.
2.5 The Leader-Follower Model of Strategic
Experimentation
We will call the 2 player game in our analysis Leader-Follower Model of
Strategic Experimentation (LFMSE). Sometimes, to emphasize the importance of
the parameters ¾1 and ¾2; we say LFMSE with parameters (¾1;¾2): It will be
shown in three steps that the equilibria of LFMSE will be of very simple type.
27In the …rst step, we will show that there is no symmetric equilibrium. In the
second step, it will be shown that if a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an equilibrium
of LFMSE, then there are 0 <c 1 <c 2 < 1 such that both players will choose
the safe one for p 2 [0;c 1]; and both will choose the risky one for p 2 (c2;1]: If
p 2 (c1;c 2]; then there will be two possible cases. Either both will use mixed
strategies or one of the players will choose the safe option, and the other chooses
the risky one. In the last step, by showing that it is impossible for both players to
use mixed strategies at the same time, we conclude that there are only asymmetric
equilibria, the structure of which is extremely simple.
2.5.1 Non-Existence of a Symmetric Equilibrium
We will now show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in the LFMSE.
We begin with the following lemma, which follows immediately from the results
summarized in Section 3.
Lemma 2.11 As t r a t e g yp r o … l e(»1;»2) is a subgame perfect Markov equilibrium
in LFMSE if and only if for all p 2 [0;1];
»1(p) 2 arg max
0·®1·1


















»2(p) 2 arg max
0·®2·1

















28where u1 and u2 are the unique solutions of the following Bellman equations, re-
spectively.
u1(p)= m a x
0·®1·1


















u2(p)= m a x
0·®2·1

















It is easy to see why there can’t be any symmetric equilibrium if ¾1 6= ¾2.I f
there were a symmetric equilibrium, since both players would behave in the same
way, their value functions should be the same. If, however, the value functions
were the same, then the informational gains from experimentation, which is de-
pendent on ¾i; would be di¤erent across players. Therefore, the cuto¤ point at
which the informational gain begins to outweigh the common opportunity cost of
experimentation would be di¤erent. Thus, they couldn’t use the same strategies.
Theorem 2.12 There is no symmetric equilibrium in LFMSE.
Proof . Suppose a strategy pro…le (»;») is a symmetric equilibrium. Let u1 be
the unique solution of the Bellman equation
u1 =m a x
0·®1·1

















29and u2 be the unique solution of the Bellman equation
u2 =m a x
0·®2·1

















Since (»;») is an equilibrium,



































From the value matching conditions including u1(1) = u2(1) = h and u1(0) =
u2(0) = l; and from the smooth pasting conditions, the above two di¤erential
equations will have the same boundary conditions so that u1 = u2 = u:
Suppose that there exists an open interval (c1;c 2) such that 0 <» (p) < 1 for
all p 2 (c1;c 2): Then, c2 · b, because of Proposition 2.6: Therefore, for p 2 (c1;c 2);
















which is impossible. Therefore, there is no open interval (c1;c 2) such that 0 <
»(p) < 1 for all p 2 (c1;c 2):
Now let c1 =s u p fc : »(p)=0for all p 2 [0;c]g: Thus, u(p)=s for all p 2
[0;c 1]: Note again that by Proposition 2.6, c1 <b . Hence, there exists c2 2 (c1;b)
































= u ¡ m(p): (2.6)


















¸ s ¡ m(p).( 2 . 7 )















= u(p) ¡ m(p)
¸ 2(s ¡ m(p));
which is a contradiction since u(p) and m(p) are continuous at c1;u (c1)=s; and
s ¡ m(c1) > 0:
2.5.2 Simple Pure Strategies and Simple Mixed Strategies
We will show in this section that if there is an equilibrium, its structure is
fairly simple. If » is an equilibrium, then there are always three intervals of p;o nt h e
…rst interval starting from zero, neither of the two players are experimenting, on the
second one adjacent to the …rst interval, either only one of them is experimenting or
both of them are experimenting at the same time, and on the last interval ending
at 1, both of them are experimenting. According to the status over the second
31interval, we will call an equilibrium simply pure or simply mixed.
De…nition 2.13 As t r a t e g yp r o … l e» =( »1;»2) is a simple pure strategy
(SPS) if there exist 0 <c 1;c 2 < 1 such that »i =0for p 2 [0;c i]; and »i =1for
p 2 (ci;1]: As t r a t e g yp r o … l e» =( »1;»2) is as i m p l em i x e ds t r a t e g y( S M S )if
there exist 0 <c 1 <c 2 < 1 such that for p 2 [0;c 1];» 1 = »2 =0 ; for p 2 (c1;c 2);
0 <» 1;»2 < 1; and for p 2 [c2;1];» 1 = »2 =1 :
Suppose that player 1 is de…nitely choosing either the safe or the risky option
on an open interval (c;c): Player 2’s best response on this interval will be the
solution to the appropriate optimal stopping problem restricted on this interval.
Hence, it will be characterized by a cuto¤ rule. The following lemma veri…es this
intuition. It shows that it is impossible for only one player to strictly mix in
equilibrium on any open interval.
Lemma 2.14 If a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an equilibrium in LFMSE,
then there is no open interval (c;c) such that for all p 2 (c;c); either »i(p)=0
and 0 <» ¡i(p) < 1 or »i(p)=1and 0 <» ¡i(p) < 1; for i =1 ;2:
Proof . Suppose there exists an open interval (c;c) such that for all p 2 (c;c),








= s ¡ m:
Thus, for all p 2 (c;c);












2 =0on this interval. From Proposition 2.6, we know that c · b; and








= s ¡ m(p) > 0;
which is a contradiction. The proof for the case when »2(p)=0and 0 <» 1(p) < 1
is similar.
Now suppose that there exists an open interval (c;c) such that, for all p 2








= s ¡ m;
and this implies that





















which is a strictly decreasing function. This is a contradiction, since u2 is increasing
by Proposition 2.5. The proof when »2(p)=1and 0 <» 1(p) < 1 is similar.
33With the above lemma, we could drastically reduce the set of strategy pro…les
that could be equilibria.
Theorem 2.15 If a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an equilibrium, then it is
either an SPS or an SMS.
Proof . We will …rst show that there is no equilibrium » =( »1;»2) such that
»1 =
(
0 if p 2 [0;c 1) or p 2 (c2;c 3]




0 if p 2 [0;c 2)
1 if p 2 (c2;1];
for 0 <c 1 <c 2 <c 3 < 1: We will prove this by comparing the number of boundary
conditions and the number of parameters in the di¤erential equation system. If »
is an equilibrium, we will have 10 coe¢cients and 3 cuto¤ points to determine. As
boundary conditions, we will have six value matching conditions at cuto¤ points,
and …ve smooth pasting conditions; one at each p = c1;c 2; and c3 for player 1, and
one at each p = c2 and c3 for player 2. Moreover, we will have three boundary
conditions about the second order derivatives of the value functions, which could be
derived from an argument similar to the discussion following the proof of Lemma
2.9. In summary, we have 13 parameters whereas we have 14 boundary conditions.
It can be shown similarly that, in general, it is impossible for the two players to
34experiment in turn at equilibrium. Now, let c1 =s u p fc : »1 =0for all p 2 [0;c)g;
c2 =s u p fc : »2 =0for all p 2 [0;c)g; c1 =i n f fc : »1 =1for all p 2 (c;1]g and
c2 =i n f fc : »2 =1for all p 2 (c;1]g:
Then, with the result demonstrated at the beginning of this proof, by Theo-
rem 2.12 and Lemma 2.14, we have to consider only the following four possibilities.
If c1 = c2; then by Lemma 2.14, »1 = »2 =0for 0 · p<c 1; and »1 = »2 =1
for c1 <p· 1: This, however, is shown to be impossible in the proof of Theorem
2.12.
If c2 <c 1; then again by Lemma 2.14, it is clearly an SPS. Also, if c1 < c2;
and c1 = c2; then again by Lemma 2.14, it is an SMS. If c1 <c 2; it is clearly an
SPS.
S u p p o s et h a tp l a y e r1a n d2a r es t r i c t l ym i x i n go na no p e ni n t e r v a l(c;c):
Then, their private bene…ts from experimentation should be the same, given the



















2(p); which implies that the curvature of u1 is strictly
greater than u2: Since their values at c are the same, it implies that u1 should be
greater than u2: For u1 = u2 = h at p =1 ; however, if u1 >u 2 for some open
interval, then u1 would be required to have smaller curvature. This is the main
35reason why we can’t have an SMS equilibrium if ¾1 6= ¾2:
The following lemma, which is a modi…cation of Theorem 9 in Bolton and
Harris (1999), will be useful in the proof of non-existence of SMS equilibria. Since
its proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.21, it will be omitted.
Lemma 2.16 Let a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) be an SMS, let ui be player i’s












If » is an SMS equilibrium, then
»1 =
(





(¾2=¾1)2¯2 if ¯2 · (¾1=¾2)2 and p<b
1 otherwise.
Theorem 2.17 If a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an equilibrium in the LFMSE,
then it is an SPS equilibrium.
Proof . With Theorem 2.15, it su¢ces to show that there is no SMS equilibrium
in the LFMSE. Suppose that » =( »1;»2) is an SMS equilibrium in the LFMSE, and
that 0 <» 1(p);»2(p) < 1 if and only if p 2 (c;c): Note that c · b by Proposition
362.6.









2(p) > 0: (2.8)
Also (1=(r¾2
2))©u00
2=2=s¡m for p 2 (c;c) implies that the value function for
player 2, u2; will be the solution of the following second order di¤erential equation:



























Therefore, for p 2 [c;c];
u2(p)=s + ¯1f(p)+¯2g(p); (2.10)
























for p 2 [c;c]:
















at p = c: From (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12),
¯1f(c)+¯2g(c)=0 :
Also, the value matching condition u1(c)=u2(c)=s implies that
¯1f(c)+¯2g(c)=0 ;
which is a contradiction since ui is strictly increasing on (c;c) due to both Propo-
sition 2.5 and u00
i > 0 for p 2 (c;c):
We have proved that there is no SMS equilibrium in the LFMSE. Conse-
quently, the symmetric equilibrium in Bolton and Harris (1999), which is an SMS,
disappears as soon as we add heterogeneity into the structure of the noise.
2.5.3 Uniqueness
For the uniqueness of each type of SPS equilibrium, given the di¤erential
equation systems for the value functions on each interval, we should have an ad-
equate number of boundary conditions. In this section, we will provide two extra
boundary conditions in addition to the usual value matching conditions and the
smooth pasting conditions. Uniqueness of each type of equilibrium will follow
immediately from this.
38Lemma 2.18 Suppose that
»i(p)=
(
0 if p 2 [0;c 1]




0 if p 2 [0;c 2]
1 if p 2 (c2;1]
i sa ne q u i l i b r i u mo fL F M S E ,w h e r e0 <c 2 <c 1 < 1=c0.L e tu
j
i(p) be the player














Proof . Since the proof for (u0
i)00(c1)=( u1
i)00(c1) is similar to that of Theorem




¡i is convex and increasing, it





there exists ">0 such that u0
¡i(p) <u 1
¡i(p) for all p 2 (c1 ¡ ";c1): If »i(p) were
1f o rp 2 (c1 ¡ ";c1); then u0
¡i(p) would still be the value function for player i:
Since »i =0for p 2 (c1 ¡ ";c1); by Proposition 2.7, u0
¡i(p) ¸ u1
¡i(p); which is a
contradiction.
W i t ht h ep r e v i o u sl e m m a ,w es e et h a tt h en u m b e ro fb o u n d a r yc o n d i t i o n si s
equal to that of parameters in our di¤erential equation systems. Hence, it should
be clear that each type of equilibrium is unique.
39Theorem 2.19 Suppose that
»i(p)=
(
0 if p 2 [0;c 1]




0 if p 2 [0;c 2]
1 if p 2 (c2;1]
;
where 0 <c 2 <c 1 < 1=c0; is an equilibrium of LFMSE. Then, there is no other
equilibrium ~ » =( ~ »1;~ »2) such that ~ »i · ~ »¡i for all p 2 [0;1]:
In the remainder of this paper, we will use a leader and a follower to distin-
guish each player at SPS equilibria in the following sense.
De…nition 2.20 As t r a t e g yp r o … l e» =( »1;»2) is an S P Sw i t hp l a y e ri as a
leader and player j as a follower, i =1or 2, j =3¡ i; if » is an SPS and if
there exist 0 <c 1 <c 2 < 1 such that »i =1 and »j =0for p 2 (c1;c 2]:
2.6 Robustness of SPS Equilibria
The main result of this section shows that, for a broad range of parameters,
the length of the interval of p on which only one player is doing experimentation
at an SPS equilibrium will be bounded away from zero. Bolton and Harris (1999)
focus only on the symmetric equilibrium with the assumption of homogeneity. That
40is, with the assumption that ¾1 = ¾2; they do not investigate the properties of an
asymmetric equilibrium. The results of this paper, however, show that the unique
symmetric equilibrium in Bolton and Harris (1999) is not robust to perturbations
in ¾i’s when there are two players. Moreover, when ¾2 is close to ¾1; the length
of the interval of p on which only one player is doing experimentation will be
shown to be bounded away from zero. This suggests the existence of an SPS
equilibrium which is asymmetric in the setting of Bolton and Harris (1999). In
fact, the existence proof for an SPS equilibrium in Section 2.8 will be valid for the
homogeneous case, too. That is, when we have homogeneous noise structures, we
have three equilibria; two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, and one symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium. Only asymmetric equilibria, however, are robust to
perturbations. Thus, we argue that, when we have two players, focusing on the
symmetric equilibrium as in Bolton and Harris (1999) has little justi…cation, and
that the focus of the future research be on the asymmetric equilibria even in the
symmetric game.
Following characterization theorem for an SPS equilibrium is crucial for the
main theorem.
Theorem 2.21 Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS with player
i as a leader and player j as a follower, i =1or 2;j=3¡i: Let ui be player i’s
41value function when she plays a best response to »¡i; and let ¯i =( ui¡s)=(s¡m)
for i =1 ;2. Then, » is an SPS equilibrium if and only if
»i =
(





0 if ¯j · (¾j=¾i)2 and p<b
1 otherwise:
For the proof of Theorem 2.21, we need a technical lemma.
Lemma 2.22 Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium,
and that »1(p)=0if 0 · p · c1;» 1(p)=1if c1 <p· 1;» 2(p)=0if 0 · p · c2;
and »1(p)=1if c2 <p· 1; where 0 <c 1 6= c2 < 1: Let ui be the value function









¸ s ¡ m;
where equality holds for at most one ~ p such that ~ p 2 (maxfc1;c 2g;b]:
Proof . W ew i l lp r o v et h i sf o rt h ec a s ec1 <c 2. The proof for the case c1 >c 2 is
similar. Since s ¡ m(p) < 0 for p>b ;it is clear that if there exists a p such that
the above inequality holds as an equality, it should be less than or equal to b:








¸ s ¡ m(p)








= s ¡ m(^ p)










As u1 is increasing by Proposition 2.5, u1(^ p)=s implies that u1 = s for all p · ^ p:
Then, u00

















= s ¡ m(~ p)
for some ~ p 2 (c2;b]: Then, we will show that there exists at most one such ~ p in
(c2;b]:




















2(s ¡ m(~ p)):
As s+(¾1=¾2)2(s¡m(p)) is a strictly decreasing function of p,t h a tu1 is increasing
43clearly implies that there exists at most one such ~ p. The proof for player 2 is
similar.
P r o o fo ft h eM a i nT h e o r e m. We will prove this for the case when player 1
is a leader and player 2 is a follower. The proof for the case when player 2 is a
leader and player 1 is a follower is similar.
=)
As t r a t e g yp r o … l e» =( »1;»2) is an equilibrium if and only if
»1 2 arg max
0·®1·1


















»2 2 arg max
0·®2·1

















where u1 and u2 are the unique solutions of the following Bellman equations,
respectively:
u1 =m a x
0·®1·1


















u2 =m a x
0·®2·1


























44for i =1 ;2: Note that vi ¸ 0 by Proposition 2.5.
Suppose that »1 6= »2 if and only if p 2 (c1;c 2]:
Suppose p<b :Then, there are three possible cases.
If 0 · p · c1; then »1 = »2 =0 : Hence, from (2.13) and (2.14), u1 = u2 = s:
) ¯1 = ¯2 =0 :
If c1 <p· c2; then »1 =1 , »2 =0 : That »2 =0implies that v2 · s ¡ m:


























If c2 <p<b ;then »1 = »2 =1 : That »1 = »2 =1implies that v1;v 2 ¸ s¡m:
Therefore, from (2.13),


















By Lemma 2.22, strict inequality holds in (2.15) for all but at most one p 2 (c2;b):
Since u1 ¡s is increasing and u00
1 ¸ 0, then it is clearly true that u1 ¡s>0 for all
45p 2 (c2;b). Hence, ¯1 > 0:
From (2.14),



































By Lemma 2.22 again, in (2.16), strict inequality holds for all but at most one
p 2 (c2;b): It is easy to see that (u2 ¡ s)=(s ¡ m) is strictly decreasing. Hence, it
is clearly true that ¯2 > (¾2=¾1)2 for all p 2 (c2;b).
Suppose p ¸ b: Then, »1 = »2 =1by Proposition 2.6, and hence there
remains nothing to show.
(=
Suppose p<b :There are three possible cases.
If v1;v 2 · s ¡ m; then we will show that (»1;»2)=( 0 ;0): From (2.14),
























Therefore, »2 =0 : With this result, from (2.13),
u1 = s + »2(¾1=¾2)
2v1 = s:
That is, »1 =0 :
If v1 >s¡ m ¸ v2; then we will show that (»1;»2)=( 1 ;0): From (2.14),
u2 = s + »1(¾2=¾1)
2v2:
Hence, as in the previous case, »2 =0 : With this result, from (2.13),













Hence, »1 =1 :
If v1;v 2 >s¡ m; then we will show that (»1;»2)=( 1 ;1): From (2.13),






















) »1 =1 : With this result, from (2.14),


























Therefore, »2 =1 :
If p ¸ b; then again there remains nothing to show due to Proposition 2.6.
Given an SPS » =( »1;»2); suppose that »1(p) 6= »2(p) if and only if p 2 (c;c]:
Then, let ´ : S2 ! R be a function de…ned as
´(»)=c ¡ c;
where S is the set of SPS. Hence, ´ is a function which maps each SPS to the
length of the interval on which only one player is experimenting.




where the inf is taken over the set of »’s such that » is an SPS equilibrium in




Proof . Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium in the
LFMSE with parameters (¾1;¾2); and that »1(p) 6= »2(p) if and only if p 2 (c;c]:
Let ui be the value function of player i when she plays a best response to »¡i: Let
c¤
1 be the cuto¤ point for player 1 when player 2 is using »2 =0 ; and let c¤
2 be the
cuto¤ point for player 2 when player 1 is using »1 =0 : That is, against »1 =0 ;
it is optimal for player 2 to choose the safe option when p 2 [0;c ¤
2]; and the risky
one when p 2 (c¤
2;1]: Also, against »2 =0 ; it is optimal for player 1 to choose
t h es a f eo p t i o nw h e np 2 [0;c ¤
1]; and the risky one when p 2 (c¤
1;1]: Finally let u¤
1
and u¤
2 be the value functions of player 1 and 2 in this case, respectively. Then,
by Proposition 2.7, u¤
1 · u1; and u¤
2 · u2: Suppose that » =( »1;»2) is an SPS
equilibrium with player 2 as a leader and player 1 as a follower. Then, u¤
2 · u2
implies that c · c¤
2: Note that c¤
2 is determined by the value matching condition





(³ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)











The following argument is based on simple geometry. Therefore, drawing a
diagram while reading the proof will be helpful.
By Theorem 2.21, at p = c





Since u1 is an increasing convex function and u1 · u = ph +( 1¡ p)s; c can’t be
less than ® such that
u(®)=s +( ¾1=¾2)
2(s ¡ m(®)):




2h ¡ s ¡ l
:
Then, since u is strictly increasing, and
s + s ¡ m(®) <s+( ¾1=¾2)
2(s ¡ m(®));








(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)
(h ¡ s)+( h ¡ l)
¸·
3 ¡ ³
(³ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)+( ³ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)
¸
:
Since ³>1; the last expression will be positive if ³<3 which is equivalent to










¤ =( 1+8 r¾2
1=(h ¡ l)2)1=2: Then, since
3 ¡ ³
(³ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)+( ³ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)
is strictly decreasing for ³ 2 [1;3];
´(») ¸
·
(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)
(h ¡ s)+( h ¡ l)
¸·
(3 ¡ ³)





(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)





¤ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)+( ³
¤ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)
¸
:
Now suppose that » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium with player 1 as a leader
and player 2 as a follower. Again u¤
1 · u1 implies that c · c¤
1: Note that c¤
1 will
be determined in the same way as c¤





¤ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)
(³
¤ ¡ 1)(s ¡ l)+( ³
¤ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)
:
Now by Theorem 2.21, at p = c





The basic idea of the proof is almost the same as in the previous case. We will
show that there is ¾¤
2 <¾ 1 such that for all ¾2 >¾ ¤
2; the distance between c¤
1 and
the intersection of s +( ¾2=¾1)2(s ¡ m) and u is bounded away from zero.
Since u2 is an increasing convex function and u2 · u = ph+(1¡p)s; c should
51b eg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o¯ such that
u(¯)=s +( ¾2=¾1)
2(s ¡ m(¯)):
It is easy to see that
¯ =
s ¡ l
(¾1=¾2)2(h ¡ s)+( h ¡ l)
:
Hence,





(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)
(³
¤ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)+( ³




(¾1=¾2)2(h ¡ s)+( h ¡ l)
¸
:
If ¾1 < (h ¡ l)=r1=2; then ³
¤ < 3; and hence, there exists ¾¤












¤ ¡ 1) > 0
for all ¾¤





(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)
(³
¤ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)+( ³








(s ¡ l)(h ¡ s)
(³
¤ +1 ) ( h ¡ s)+( ³






2)2(h ¡ s)+( h ¡ l)
¸
for all ¾2 such that ¾¤
2 <¾ 2 <¾ 1:




522.7 The Value Functions at SPS Equilibria
Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium with player
1 as a leader and player 2 as a follower. Then, since player 2 is experimenting less
and free riding on player 1’s experimentation for some range of beliefs, we could
conjecture that the payo¤ of player 2 is greater than that of player 1. We will
prove in this section that this conjecture is indeed true. With this result, LFMSE
can be understood as a simple coordination game. There are only two kinds of
equilibria, and who will have a better payo¤ is determined according to which type
of equilibria they are playing. That is, the player who is allowed to free ride will
have a higher payo¤.
We need the following lemma, which is interesting in itself, to prove the main
result in this section.
Lemma 2.24 Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium,
and that »1 6= »2 if and only if p 2 (c1;c 2]: Let ui be the value function of player
i when she plays a best response to »¡i;i=1 ;2: Then,
u
00
2(p)[u1(p) ¡f (1 ¡ »1(p))s + »1(p)m(p)g]
= u
00
1(p)[u2(p) ¡f (1 ¡ »2(p))s + »2(p)m(p)g]
for all p 2 [0;1]nfc1;c 2g:
53Proof . We will prove for the case when player 1 is a leader. The proof for
the case when player 2 is a leader is similar. Suppose that » =( »1;»2) is an
SPS equilibrium with player 1 as a leader and player 2 as a follower, and that
»1(p) 6= »2(p) if and only if p 2 (c1;c 2]: Then,
»1 =
(
0 if 0 · p · c1




0 if 0 · p · c2
1 if c2 <p· 1:





s if 0 · p · c1
m +( 1 =(r¾2
1))©u00
1=2 if c1 <p· c2
m +( 1 =r)(1=¾2
1 +1 =¾2
2)©u00






s if 0 · p · c1
s +( 1 =(r¾2
1))©u00
2=2 if c1 <p· c2
m +( 1 =r)(1=¾2
1 +1 =¾2
2)©u00
2=2 if c2 <p· 1:
From this, the statement is clearly true.
Since u00
i > 0 for p 2 (c1;1]nfc2g; we obtain




u2(p) ¡f (1 ¡ »2(p))s + »2(p)m(p)g
u00
2(p)
for p 2 (c1;1]nfc2g: The numerators are the di¤erences between overall optimal
payo¤ and the instant expected payo¤. That is, it measures the gain from addi-
tional information generated by experimenting at equilibrium. The denominators
54are private shadow prices of the information for each player. Hence, at equilibrium,
when information has a positive shadow price for each player, the ratio of the gain
from information to the private shadow price of the information is equalized across
the players.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.25 Suppose that a strategy pro…le » =( »1;»2) is an SPS equilibrium
and that »1 6= »2 if and only if p 2 (c1;c 2]: Let ui be the value function of player i
when she plays a best response against »¡i;i=1 ;2: Then, ui · u¡i if and only if
» is an SPS equilibrium with player i as a leader and player 3 ¡ i as a follower,
i =1 ;2: The inequality is strict for p 2 (c1;1):
Proof . We will prove the theorem for the case when player 2 is a leader. The
proof for the case when player 1 is a leader is similar. Suppose that » =( »1;»2) is
an SPS equilibrium with player 2 as a leader and player 1 as a follower. Note that
c2 · b by Proposition 2.6.
We will …rst show that u1 >u 2 locally to the right of c1: And then, by
showing that it is impossible for u1(p)=u2(p) for some p such that c1 <p<c 2;
we will derive the conclusion that u1 >u 2 for every p 2 (c1;1).
From


















for p 2 (c1;c 2); we obtain
u1 = s + ¯1f(p)+¯2g(p);
and

















In the above, ¯1;¯2; ^ ¯1; and ^ ¯2 are parameters that will be determined by the
boundary conditions.
Note that f;g > 0 for p 2 (c1;c 2]: Therefore, u1(c1)=s implies that ¯1 and
¯2 have opposite signs. Since f is increasing, and g is decreasing, for u1 to be
increasing, it should be that
¯1 < 0; and ¯2 > 0:
From this, it follows that the right derivative of u1 for p = c1 is strictly positive.
The smooth pasting condition for player 2, however, implies that u0
2 =0for p = c1:
56Consequently, u1 >u 2 locally to the right of c1:
Now we will show that u1 >u 2 for all p 2 (c1;c 2):
Suppose there exists a p 2 (c1;c 2) such that u1(p)=u2(p): Let ~ p be the
in…mum of those p’s. That is, u1 >u 2 for p 2 (c1; ~ p); and u1 = u2 for p =~ p: From
Lemma 2.24, for p =~ p;
u
00
1(~ p)[u2(~ p) ¡ m(~ p)] = u
00
2(~ p)[u1(~ p) ¡ s]:






Since u1 >u 2 for p 2 (c1; ~ p); and u1 = u2 for p =~ p; and since the value functions






Therefore, there exists c · c2 such that for p 2 (~ p;c);

















which in turn implies from Lemma 2.24 that u00
2 >u 00
1 for p 2 (~ p;c): That is, u2¡u1
is strictly convex on (~ p;c), u2 ¡ u1 > 0 for p 2 (~ p;c); and u2 ¡ u1 =0for p =~ p:
Hence, it is easy to see that u2 >u 1 for all p 2 (c1;c 2]:
57Now, for p 2 (c2;1];



































Thus, for p 2 (c2;1];
u1 = m + °1 ~ f(p);
and















Here °i’s are positive parameters. Then, that u2(c2) >u 1(c2) implies that °2 >° 1;





1 =( °2 ¡ °1) ~ f
00(p) > 0
for all p 2 (c2;1]: Recall that by Theorem 2.18 and the smooth pasting condition,
the right and left derivative of u1 and u2 at c2 should be equal to each other. Hence,
overall, u2 ¡ u1 is increasing, strictly convex, and di¤erentiable for p 2 (~ p;1); and
u2 ¡ u1 =0at p =~ p; which contradicts the fact that u2 ¡ u1 =0at p =1 :
58We’ve shown that u1 >u 2 for p 2 (c1;c 2): Now we will show that it is
impossible for u1(c1)=u2(c2); w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tu1 >u 2 for all p 2 (c1;1);
since if u1(c1) >u 2(c2); then °1 >° 2 so that u1 = m + °1 ~ f>u 2 = m + °2 ~ f:
Suppose u1(c1)=u2(c2): Then, °1 = °2; and hence u1 = u2 for all p ¸ c2: At
p = c2; since u1 >u 2 for p 2 (c1;c 2);u 1 = u2 for p 2 (c2;1]; and since p follows a
Brownian motion so that there is a positive probability that p will fall below c2; it
is impossible that u1(c1)=u2(c2): Contradiction.
In the proof of Theorem 2.25, we showed that if » =( »1;»2) is an SPS
equilibrium with player 2 as a leader and player 1 as a follower, and if »1 6= »2 if
and only if p 2 (c1;c 2]; then the right derivative of the value function of player 1,
u1; at p = c1 is strictly positive. Therefore, u0
1(c1)+u0
2(c1) > 0: In the analysis
of the Team Problem, however, we showed that u0
¤(^ c)=0when ^ c is the cuto¤
point for player 2’s experimentation. Since an SPS equilibrium with player 1 as a
leader and player 2 as a follower is obviously ine¢cient, overall, every equilibrium
in LFMSE is not e¢cient. As u1 + u2 · 2u¤ at both equilibria, we will have less
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o nt h a no p t i m a li nt h en e i g h b o r h o o do fc1 at which the leader begins
to experiment.
592.8 Existence of an SPS Equilibrium
The existence of both kinds of SPS equilibria can be easily shown by a simple
application of Knaster-Tarski’s …xed point theorem. Knaster-Tarski’s …xed point
theorem is for an increasing function de…ned on a partially ordered set. Suppose
that f : W!W is a non decreasing function, where W is a partially ordered set.
That is, if w1 · w2;w 1;w 2 2W ,t h e nf(w1) · f(w2): Suppose also that there
exists ~ w 2W such that ~ w · f(~ w); and that every linearly ordered chain in W
has a supremum in W.T h e n , f has a …xed point in W.4
Theorem 2.26 There exist an SPS equilibrium with player 1 as a leader and
player 2 as a follower and an SPS equilibrium with player 2 as a leader and player
1 as a follower in LFMSE.
Proof . Let U be the set of Lipschitz continuous functions u :[ 0 ;1] ! [l;h]
such that 0 · u0 · h ¡ l almost everywhere on [0;1]; and let S be the set of
simple strategies » :[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1] with »
0;»
1 :[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1] ,w h e r e»
0 =0and
»
1 =1for all p 2 [0;1]: Here U and S may be interpreted, respectively, as the
space of the value functions and the space of the SPS. Let’s de…ne three functions,
4 For proof, see Dugundji and Granas (1982).
60ºL;º1F;º2F : U!Sas follows:
ºL(u)(p)=
(









0 if (u(p) ¡ s)=(s ¡ m(p)) · (¾2=¾1)2 and p<b
1 otherwise.
Let Ã1 : U2 !S 2 be the function de…ned as
Ã1(u1;u 2)=
½
(ºL(u1);º2F(u2)) if ºL(u1) ¸ º2F(u2)
(´L;´F) otherwise,
where ´L;´F 2Sare de…ned as
´L(p)=
(
0 if p 2 [0;(1 + b)=2]




0 if p 2 [0;(2 + b)=3]
1 if p 2 ((2 + b)=3;1]:
Also, let Ã2 : U2 !S 2 be the function de…ned as
Ã2(u1;u 2)=
½
(º1F(u1);ºL(u2)) if ºL(u2) ¸ º1F(u1)
(´F;´L) otherwise.
Then, the mapping Ã : U2 !S 4 de…ned as Ã(u1;u 2)=( Ã1(u1;u 2);Ã2(u1;u 2)) will
map each pair of value functions into a pair of strategy pro…les, the …rst of which
is an SPS with player 1 as a leader and player 2 as a follower, and the second of
which is an SPS with player 2 as a leader and player 1 as a follower. Note that,
by construction, Ã is increasing.
61Let ¸ : S2 !U 2 be de…ned as ¸(»1;»2)=( u1;u 2),w h e r eui is the value
function of player i when she plays a best response to »¡i: And de…ne ¤:S4 !U 4
as ¤(»1;»2;»3;»4)=( ¸(»1;»2);¸(»3;»4)): Note again that ¤ is increasing by Lemma
2.7.
Let ½1;½ 2 : U4 !U 2 b et h ep r o j e c t i o nm a p p i n g sd e … n e da sf o l l o w s .
½1(u1;u 2;u 3;u 4)=( u1;u 2);
and
½2(u1;u 2;u 3;u 4)=( u3;u 4):
Now we are ready to de…ne our main mapping h1;h 2 : U2 !U 2 which will be
shown to have a …xed point. Let’s de…ne h1 and h2 as
h1 = ½1 ± ¤ ± Ã;
and
h2 = ½2 ± ¤ ± Ã:
From Theorem 2.21, it is clear that if h1 has a …xed point (u1;u 2) such that
Ã1(u1;u 2) 6=( ´L;´F), then there is an SPS equilibrium with player 1 as a leader
and player 2 as a follower. Also it is true that if h2 has a …xed point (u1;u 2) such
that Ã2(u1;u 2) 6=( ´F;´L), then there is an SPS equilibrium with player 2 as a
leader and player 1 as a follower.
The conclusion of the theorem follows immediately from Knaster-Tarski’s
62…xed point theorem and Proposition 2.6.
Since Ã;¤; and ½i’s are increasing, the hi are increasing. Moreover, (u;u) ·
hi(u;u) by Proposition 2.4. Hence, by Knaster-Tarski’s …xed point theorem, there
exist …xed points for the hi. Now from Proposition 2.6, it is clear that if (u1;u 2)
is a …xed point for h1; then Ã1(u1;u 2) 6=( ´L;´F). Similarly, if (u1;u 2) is a …xed
point for h2; then Ã2(u1;u 2) 6=( ´F;´L).
The above proof is also valid for the homogeneity case, i.e. when ¾1 = ¾2:
Therefore, if the number of players in Bolton and Harris (1999) is two, then there
will be asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium.
At the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in Bolton and Harris (1999),
once the two players begin to choose the risky option, they keep choosing it indef-
initely.5 At an SPS equilibrium, however, the probability of event fp(t) · c; for
some t · Tg is always positive for all T>0 and for all p(0) >c : Thus, at asym-
metric equilibria, even if the prior belief is high enough that one or both players
do experimentation, there is a positive probability that they will end up with the
safe option, and that they keep choosing it, which is impossible at the symmetric
equilibrium.
We conjecture that in an N-player game with 0 <¾ N <: : :<¾ 1,t h e r e
are N! types of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, each of which has the same
5 See Bolton and Harris (1999), p 363.
63structure. That is, at each type of equilibria, there exist (i1;i 2;:::;iN) which is a
permutation of (1;2;:::;N) and N cuto¤ points 0 <c N < ::: < c1 < 1 such that
player ik is choosing the risky option if and only if p 2 (ck;1]:
Lastly, it should not be puzzling much that LFMSE has two asymmetric
equilibria. Since we have focused only on Markov strategies, many other equilibria
may have been ignored. Fully characterizing all the equilibria is, however, certainly





It has long been observed that the existence of informational externality is
often the source of ine¢cient resource allocation. For example, from Bolton and
Harris (1999) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we see that the existence of infor-
mational externality will result in less than optimal level of social learning when
people behave strategically. As it is impossible for people to fully appropriate the
informational bene…ts of their experimentations in these models, the production
65of information at equilibrium will be suboptimal.
In this chapter, we will show that price competition al aBertrand between
…rms can lead to the e¢cient level of social learning in the setting of Bolton and
Harris (1999). Thus, the informational externality Bolton and Harris (1999) study
is of such a kind that could be overcome by introducing a market competition. By
contrast, it will be shown that the informational externality such as we study in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation can’t be remedied by introducing price competition.
In Bolton and Harris (1999), one buyer’s experimentation could be perfectly sub-
stituted by another buyer’s experimentation. In the model of Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, however, due to the di¤erences in the qualities of the information
from each buyer’s experimentation, buyer 2’s experimentation can’t be perfectly
substituted by buyer 1’s experimentation. Hence, unless buyer 1 and 2 have op-
portunities to transfer between them in order to internalize this externality, mere
price competition between …rms will not guarantee e¢ciency.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game. The
e¢cient allocation will be reported in Section 3. In Section 4, we will show that
if there is a symmetric equilibrium at which the incumbent …rm’s smooth pasting
condition is satis…ed, it is e¢cient. We will then comment on Bergemann and
Välimäki (2000). In Bergemann and Välimäki (2000), they study the same model
independently and conclude that equilibrium allocations are not e¢cient. We will
66argue that their reasoning is incorrect. In Section 5, it will be shown that linear
prices equilibrium exists. In so doing, we resolve the existence problem, and at the
same time, show how to calculate an equilibrium. In Section 6, we show that it is
impossible to achieve e¢cient allocation with heterogeneous buyers.
3.2 A Continuous-Time Market Game
3.2.1 The Model
There are N in…nitely-lived risk-neutral buyers who will be indexed by i =
1;2;:::;N. There are two …rms selling di¤erentiated products, the incumbent (…rm
I) and the entrant (…rm E). At each time period [t;t + dt),e a c hb u y e rh a sa
unit demand at maximum for products of …rm I and E: The ‡ow payo¤ from the
product of …rm I is known to be s: The ‡ow payo¤ from the product of …rm E;
¹; is, however, unknown to all the buyers and sellers at time 0, although ¹ is …xed
at h or l: We will assume that 0 <l<s<h :Buyers and …rms share the common
prior probability of ¹ being h at time 0:
At the beginning of each time period [t;t + dt); both …rms will announce
simultaneously their prices. Given those prices, each buyer will choose the product
of which …rm to buy. Let pI(t) and pE(t) be the prices …rm I and E charge buyers






(s ¡ pI(t))dt if she buys at …rm I
(¹ ¡ pE(t))dt + ¾dZi(t) if she buys at …rm E
0 otherwise,
where the dZi(t) are the independent standard Brownian motions for i =1 ;2;:::;N:
Standard Brownian motions could be understood as continuous-time version of ran-
dom walks. To be precise, dZi(t) will be distributed following normal distribution
whose mean and variance are zero and dt; respectively. Thus, the unknown quality
of the product of …rm E can be learned, but not perfectly due to the noises added
to the payo¤s.
Marginal cost of production of each …rm is normalized to be zero. Hence, the
‡ow payo¤ of …rm J 2f I;Eg at time period [t;t + dt); when 0 · k · N buyers




Buyers and sellers are assumed to maximize the present discounted value
of their payo¤ streams, namely E[
R 1
0 re¡rtdvi(t)] for buyer 1 · i · N; and
E[
R 1
0 re¡rtdwJ(t)] for …rm J 2f I;Eg: It will be assumed that at the begin-
ning of the time period [t;t+dt); all the prices announced by the sellers, decisions
of the buyers’, and payo¤s to all the players in the past are common knowledge.
Therefore, there is no hidden information. The assumption of complete observabil-
ity enables the players to learn not only from his own experimentation, but also
68from other player’s experimentation. Therefore, information about the unknown
quality is a kind of public good, which will be provided when buyers experiment.
3.2.2 Belief, Strategies and Equilibrium
Since there is no hidden information, the buyers and the …rms will have
common posterior belief ¯(t) at each time t; which will be our natural choice
for the state variable. We will focus on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria:
Strategies of buyers and sellers will not depend on payo¤ irrelevant variables. A
pricing strategy of …rm J 2f I;Eg;p J, is a measurable function from [0;1] to
R: Thus, each …rm’s pricing strategy will depend only on the state variable ¯(t):
Buyers’ decisions, however, will depend on the announced prices, too. Hence, an
acceptance policy of buyer i; di =( dI
i;d E
i ); is de…ned to be a measurable function
from [0;1] £ R2 to f(0;0);(0;1);(1;0)g: Note that an acceptance policy of buyer
i does not allow him to mix between the two products. As Bertrand competition
will not let buyers mix at equilibrium, there will be no loss of generality, however.
Given a strategy pro…le ((di);p I;p E); we will use d¡i or p¡J to denote the strategy
pro…les of all the buyers and sellers except buyer i or seller J, respectively. That is,
d¡i and p¡I will stand for ((dj)j6=i;p I;p E) and ((di);p E); respectively: As t r a t e g y
pro…le ((di);p I;p E) is a Markov perfect equilibrium if di is an acceptance policy
of buyer i 2f 1;2;:::;Ng;p J is a pricing strategy of …rm J 2f I;Eg;d i is a best
69response to d¡i for all i 2f 1;2;:::;Ng; and if pJ is a best response to p¡J for all
j 2f I;Eg:
In a discrete-time model, it is di¢cult to describe the posterior beliefs in
a tractable way. By contrast, in a continuous-time model, the law of motion of
¯(t) can be nicely described, which explains the main reason why we are using a
continuous-time model. The following proposition can be proved as Proposition
2.1.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that di is the acceptance policy of buyer i =1 ;2;:::;N:
Then, conditional on the information available at time t, the change in belief d¯(t)






where ©(¯)=[ ¯(1 ¡ ¯)(h ¡ l)]2:
Note that ©(0) = ©(1) = 0: Therefore, once they become sure about ¹; from
that point on, there will be no further change in ¯; w h i c hi sac o m m o nf e a t u r e
of Bayesian learning. The more accurate the information is, the more radically
the posterior belief will change. As an extreme case, if players could observe ¹
accurately in the period [t;t+dt); then the posterior at the period [t+dt;t+2dt)
will be either l or h so that the ratio of the change in the belief to the length of
70time would be in…nity. Hence, the variance would also be in…nite. Overall, the




i in the variance of ¯(t):
3.2.3 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations
Due to Proposition 3.1, we can use Itô’s lemma to derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation of buyer i: HJB equation is the dynamic programming
equation in our continuous-time setting.
Let m(¯)=¯h+( 1¡ ¯)l be the myopic expected payo¤ from the product
of …rm E when ¹ is believed to be h with probability ¯: Then, the value function
of buyer i will be determined as
























The HJB equation consists of two parts. The …rst portions, s¡pI and m(¯)¡pE;
represent the instant expected ‡ow payo¤. The expected future bene…ts from the




















71As the portion of the variance part measures the amount of information that will
be generated from buyers’ experimentations, we could interpret u00
i(p) as shadow
price of information.


















As seen in Chapter 2, equilibria of this game will be determined by a system of
second order di¤erential equations of (ui)i;¼I; and ¼E with appropriate boundary
conditions. In the remainder of this paper, for notational convenience, we will
suppress the dependence of u1;u 2;¼I;¼I;m;and © on ¯ as long as there is no risk
of confusion.
3.3 E¢cient Allocation
As a benchmark for our equilibrium analysis, we will investigate the team
problem …rst. In the team problem, a social planner will maximize the average
payo¤ of all the players. Since payments from the buyers to the sellers will be
cancelled out, the social planner’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the average
payo¤ of the buyers when the two products are freely available. It is easy to see
that this problem will be an optimal stopping problem. Therefore, the e¢cient
allocation will be represented by a single cuto¤ ^ ¯; all the buyers should choose
72the product of …rm E if and only if ¯ 2 (^ ¯;1]: Let u¤ be the value function of
the social planner’s problem when the two products are for free. Thus, Nu¤ will
be the maximized sum of payo¤s of all the players. For the proof of the following
result, see Bolton and Harris (1999).
Theorem 3.2 The e¢cient cuto¤ is
^ ¯ =
(s ¡ l)(¸ ¡ 1)








The value function of the social planner’s problem is
u¤ =
(



















Note that ^ ¯<¯ M where ¯M is the myopically break-even point such that
m(¯M)=s: As the information about the unknown quality ¹ is valuable, at
optimal allocation, social learning should occur even if myopically it may not be
worth choosing the product of …rm E: As we noted before, u00
¤ could be interpreted
73as shadow price of information. By direct calculation, it can be seen that u00
¤(¯) > 0
for ¯ 2 (^ ¯;1):
3.4 Symmetric Equilibria
Due to price competition al aBertrand, multiplicity of equilibria is inevitable.
Therefore, to narrow down the set of equilibria, we need to put some restrictions on
it. As we do not have a satisfactory re…nement concept for continuous-time games
yet, we will put only the weakest restrictions. We require that whenever players
cease to learn, the equilibria should be Nash equilibria in undominated strategies
in the corresponding static game. Therefore, for instance, if ¯ =0 ; i.e. the quality
of the product of …rm E is believed to be l for sure, then we will choose as the
equilibrium (pI;p E)=( s ¡ l;0) with all the buyers choosing …rm E: We believe
that undominatedness in static case is the minimum that should be satis…ed by
any attempt to re…ne equilibria of continuous-time games.
Under this minimum restriction, we will show in the following that if a sym-
metric equilibrium is characterized by a cuto¤ ¯
¤ and if the value function of the
incumbent is smooth at the cuto¤; then the equilibrium cuto¤ ¯
¤ is identical with
^ ¯: Therefore, all the symmetric equilibria of this type will be e¢cient. Bertrand
competition adjust prices so that the resulting social learning is to the adequate
74amount.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Prices
Suppose that there is a symmetric equilibrium with a cuto¤ ¯
¤ such that all
the buyers will choose …rm E if and only if ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]: Let ¼J and u be the value
function of …rm J 2f I;Eg and the common value function of the buyers at this
symmetric equilibrium, respectively.
T h e n ,w ew i l lh a v ef r o m( 3 . 1 )













for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]: At equilibrium, price competition between two …rms will force
the above inequality to hold with equality, which implies that the opportunity






. By rearranging terms, we have
p
I = p







































By combining these two inequalities with (3.2), we have the following necessary
condition for an equilibrium price pI:


















If ¯ 2 [0;¯
¤]; there will be no experimentation. Hence, from undominated-
ness, we obtain
p
I = s ¡ m(¯)
p
E =0
as the equilibrium prices. It is immediate that u(¯)=m(¯) for ¯ 2 [0;¯
¤]: The
payo¤s of the buyers will be exactly equal to the value of their outside options. It
76is also clear that
¼
I = N(s ¡ m)
¼
E =0
for ¯ 2 [0;¯
¤]:
To …nd an equilibrium, we have to solve a system of second order di¤erential
equations for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]. Boundary conditions for this system are from the value
matching conditions and the smooth pasting conditions. The value matching con-
ditions are simply conditions about continuity of the value functions at the cuto¤
point. The smooth pasting conditions are a kind of …rst order conditions for our
stochastic dynamic programming problem, which require that the left derivative
and the right derivative of each value function at the cuto¤ point should be the
same.





























77Since ¼I is bounded for all ¯ 2 (¯

















¤)=[ N(s ¡ m(¯
¤))]
0 = N(l ¡ h):
Therefore, two unknowns, c1 and ¯
¤; will be determined from the above boundary
conditions of …rm I: It can be shown that the equilibrium cuto¤ ¯
¤ coincides with
the socially e¢cient cuto¤ level.
Theorem 3.3 If there is a symmetric equilibrium at which the smooth pasting
condition of the incumbent is satis…ed, it is e¢cient.























































=( l ¡ h):
78It is immediate that
¯
¤ =
(s ¡ l)(¸ ¡ 1)
(h ¡ l)(¸ ¡ 1) + 2(h ¡ s)
= ^ ¯:
The intuition behind this e¢ciency result is rather simple. In the social
planner’s problem, the opportunity cost of buyers’ choosing the risky option is
N(s¡m(¯)): As ¼I(¯)=N(s¡m(¯)); the private cost of the incumbent …rm for
letting buyers choose …rm E will be exactly equal to the social opportunity cost.
Therefore, in the pro…t maximization problem of …rm I, the social opportunity
cost is fully re‡ected. As the results of buyers’ experimentation shift ¯ up or
down, the resulting social pessimism or optimism about the product of …rm E
will be fully re‡ected in pE: Thus, when buyers are buying at …rm E; the sum
of the informational bene…ts for buyers and that for …rm E will be zero. Hence,
when …rm E is selling, the total social informational bene…t will be equal to the
informational bene…t for …rm I who can fully observe buyers’ experimentation.
Indeed, from ¯























In summary, since …rm I’s private cost and bene…t of letting buyers experiment are
79equal to the social opportunity cost of and the social informational bene…t from
buyers’ experimentation, …rm I’s optimal choice will be identical with socially
optimal timing.
It is also notable that for the e¢ciency result, we do not need …rm E: What
is crucial is that the private cost of …rm I for letting buyers to choose the risky
option is equal to the social cost. Therefore, even in the case where buyers have
free access to the risky product whereas the safe option is provided by …rm I; we
could still obtain the e¢ciency result. Similarly, it can be shown that we could
achieve the e¢cient allocation with only …rm E selling the risky product, while
the buyers have free access to the safe one.
3.4.3 Comments on Bergemann and Välimäki (2000)
In an earlier but independent work, Bergemann and Välimäki (2000) analyze
the same game with ours. They conclude that there will be excessive experimen-
tation at the symmetric equilibrium. Their paper is, however, ‡awed by a serious
mistake.
To overcome the multiplicity of equilibria, they introduce the concept of cau-









80By focusing on cautious equilibrium, however, they kill one degree of freedom that
is indispensable to satisfy the two boundary conditions for ¼E: Since (3.3) is the
main source for multiplicity of equilibria, they seem to attempt to overcome this
problem by choosing a speci…c pI: In so doing, however, they throw away too
much so that they can’t have enough degree of freedom to satisfy all the boundary
conditions. For instance, at the state they claim to be an equilibrium, we can
show that the smooth pasting condition for …rm I is violated. In private corre-
spondence, they argue that smooth pasting condition is not a necessary condition
for optimality for the incumbent since the payo¤ from the stopped process of the
incumbent is kinked at the cuto¤ of the cautious equilibrium. This observation
is correct. We do not know yet the general necessary conditions for optimality in
case the payo¤ from the stopped process is not di¤erentiable, which is the reason
why we have an additional assumption about the smoothness of the value function
of the incumbent in Theorem 3.3. Without a doubt, however, in order to claim
that a state is an equilibrium, we ought to show explicitly that all the people in
the model are indeed optimizing. Bergemann and Välimäki mistakenly identify
equation (18) with (19) in their paper to conclude that they can omit to check
t h eo p t i m a l i t yc o n d i t i o n sf o rt h ei n c u m b e n t .T h i si sap i t y ,s i n c es t i l lw ed on o t
know if the cautious equilibrium in Bergemann and Välimäki (2000) is really an
equilibrium.
813.5 Linear Prices
Now we have two more di¤erential equations:














We know from Theorem 3.3, all the symmetric equilibria are e¢cient if the value
function of the incumbent is smooth. Therefore, we do not have to solve both




E + Nu= Nu¤;
we can get u as a residual. Since the value matching condition and the smooth















the value function u obtained as a residual will automatically satisfy its own value







With …xed pE;p I will be determined by (3.2). Therefore, to …nd an equilib-
rium is to …nd a pricing policy pE such that the resulting ¼E and ¼I will satisfy
all the boundary conditions while pI determined by (3.2) will satisfy (3.3). Since
the binding restrictions for pE a r el o c a l( i ti sr e q u i r e do n l ya t¯
¤); there will be
plethora of equilibria.
In this section, we will show that there is a very simple pricing policies to
support the equilibrium cuto¤: A selling …rm’s price will be linear function of the
posterior belief ¯: We have already chosen
p
I = s ¡ m(¯)
as the equilibrium price of …rm I for ¯ 2 [0;¯
¤]: Thus, it su¢ces to show the
existence of equilibrium pE which is a linear function of ¯ for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]:
Theorem 3.4 There is a symmetric equilibrium where
p
E = m(¯) ¡ s
for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]: There is no other equilibrium policies where pE is a linear function
of ¯ for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]:
83Proof . Suppose that pE = a + b¯ is an equilibrium price. Due to the undomi-
natedness in static Bertrand competition, we have
p









for ¯ 2 (¯
¤;1]; and since ¼E is bounded, the general solution for ¼E will be
¼































¤ is chosen already so that the optimality condition for …rm I is
satis…ed. Also, by de…ning u as






it can be seen that the optimality conditions for the buyers are automatically
84satis…ed.

























































In the above proof, we have shown that if the price of the selling …rm is linear





E = N[m(¯) ¡ s]+Naf(¯)




















That is, the sum of the informational bene…t for …rm E and the informational
bene…t of all buyers will always be zero when …rm E is selling. This again veri…es
our intuition in Section 3.4.2.
3.6 Heterogeneous Buyers
Instead of N homogeneous buyers, suppose that we have 2 buyers who have
di¤erent abilities to evaluate the uncertain quality of the product of …rm E: More





(s ¡ pI(t))dt if she buys at …rm I
(¹ ¡ pE(t))dt + ¾idZi(t) if she buys at …rm E
0 otherwise,
where 0 <¾ 2 <¾ 1: Hence, buyer 2’s experimentation will provide more precise
information about the true quality of the product of …rm E: In fact, this is the
same model we study in Chapter 2 except that two options are now being sold
86by two competing …rms. From Proposition 2.1, it is immediate that d¯(t) will be












In this section, we will show that unlike the case of homogeneous buyers it is
impossible to achieve the e¢cient allocation.
We will allow the possibility of price discrimination. Thus, a pricing strategy
of …rm J 2f I;Eg is now de…ned as pJ =( pJ
1;p J
2); where pJ
i is the price that …rm
J charges buyer i: Then, buyer 1’s HJB equation will be






























Price competition between two …rms will make the two terms in max operator
equal to each other at equilibrium. Hence,
p
E











Similarly, from buyer 2’s HJB equation, we have
p
E











What (3.5) and (3.6) imply is simply that private opportunity cost of choosing the
risky option is equal to the private informational bene…t from experimentation,
which, obviously, ought to be true at equilibrium.
87HJB equations for …rm I and E will be
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Now we will prove that it is impossible to obtain e¢cient allocation at equi-
librium.
Theorem 3.5 When buyers are heterogeneous, there is no equilibrium which
is e¢cient.
Proof . With (3.5) and (3.6), the HJB equation of …rm E will be
¼











































































We know from the analysis of Team problem in Chapter 2 that the e¢cient al-
location will be represented by two cuto¤s 0 <¯ 2 <¯ 1 < 1 such that buyer i
selects the product of …rm E if and only if ¯>¯ i: Hence, suppose that we have




1; and that buyer i selects the product
of …rm E if and only if ¯>¯
0
i: This implies that
the second term in …rm I’s HJB equation
? the last term in …rm I’s HJB equation
if and only if
the second term in …rm E’s HJB equation
? the last term in …rm E’s HJB equation.
Therefore, the cuto¤ ¯
0












Similarly, the cuto¤ ¯
0

























89with (s¡m) to determine ¯i: T h ev a l u ef u n c t i o n so fb o t hp l a y e r sc a nb es h o w nt o
be concave as in Chapter 2. Thus, u00
i 6=0so that the equilibrium allocation will
not be e¢cient.
Unlike the homogeneous case, price competition will not guarantee e¢ciency
here. In the homogeneous case, one buyer’s experimentation could be perfectly
substituted with another buyer’s. In the heterogeneous case, however, due to the
di¤erences in the qualities of the information their experimentations will generate,
buyer 2’s experimentation can only partially be substituted with buyer 1’s. Hence,
without having opportunities for buyer 1 and buyer 2 to sign a contract in order
to internalize this externality, it is impossible for market equilibria to be e¢cient.
90Chapter 4






In Chapter 2 and 3, we analyze strategic experimentation with continuous-
91time models, even though it is still an open question how to generally set up
continuous-time multi-player multi-armed bandit problems. Most di¢culties are
around the notion of strategies. Nevertheless, in the models we use in Chapter
2 and 3, we could represent the law of motion of the posterior in a closed form,
which explains why we adopt continuous-time models in spite of all the technical
di¢culties.
In this chapter, we turn to discrete-time models. Unlike continuous-time
models, we can provide a general setting for multi-player multi-armed bandit prob-
lems in discrete-time set up. We will assume perfect observability. That is, at any
period m, all the previous selections of all the players and the results of their
choices are commonly known to all the players. Therefore, the players will share
the same information about the k alternatives, and thus, hidden information will
not be an issue. Under this assumption, we will generalize Section 2.2 in Berry
and Fristedt (1985) to n player case. Then, we will show that there exists pure
Markov strategy equilibria.
This chapter is organized as follows. General setting is described in Section
2. Best response is de…ned and shown to be non-empty in Section 3. In Section
4, we will show that value functions are continuous in other players’ strategies.
Existence of pure Markov strategy equilibrium is proved in Section 5.
924.2 General Setting
There are n players. Each of them has k alternatives to select at each time
t =1 ;2;:::.I fp l a y e ri selects j- t ho p t i o na tt = m, his payo¤ will be Xi
j;m; which
is a random variable. The distribution of fXi
j;mg is not known to any player at
t =0 : We assume that the players have common prior belief about fXi
j;mg at t =0 :
We also assume that fXi
j;mg are independent, and that the distribution of Xi
j;m
is equal to that of Xi0
j0;m0 if and only if j = j0: Hence, each player will be in an
identical situation, and his payo¤ relevant variable will not be directly in‡uenced
by other players’ actions. The actions of other players will have e¤ects on player
i’s decision not because his payo¤ will vary according to their choices, but because
he might get some information about the uncertain alternatives by observing their
selections and the results of their decisions.
Let D represent the space of probability distributions on R; the set of real
numbers: We will use the topology of convergence in distribution on D. That is,




R hdQ for all
bounded continuous function h on R: The space of ordered k-tuples of D, Dk,w i l l
be considered to have the product topology arising from the topology on D.T h e
coordinate Qj of Q =( Q1;Q 2;:::;Qk) 2D k is interpreted as the true but unknown
distribution governing the payo¤ of j-th alternative. The space of probability
distributions on Dk is D(Dk): The common prior belief about Q will be described
93by an element of D(Dk): We will use the topology of convergence in distribution
on D(Dk).









The probability measure P on ­ is the product of a member of D(Dk) and Lebesgue
measure on each unit intervals. We can denote an element of ­ as
! =( Qi;1 · i · k;!
i
j;m;1 · i · n;1 · j · k;m =1 ;2;:::);
where each Qi 2Dand each !i
j;m 2 (0;1): Let the random variable Xi
j;m; the










j is the usual right continuous inverse function of Qj: The structure of ­
re‡ects the idea that the payo¤ of each option is determined when ! 2 ­ is …xed
whether or not they are observed. For player i to select j-th alternative at t = m is
to get to observe the value Xi
j;m(!): Note that fXi
j;mg are independent conditional
on (Q1;Q 2;:::;Qk):
When a player selects some option, all the information that will be relevant
later on is which alternative he selects and what his payo¤ from that option is.
Thus, his experimentation can be summarized by e 2 E; where
E = f(e1;e 2):e1 2f 1;2;:::;kg;e 2 2 Rg:
94We will equip E with the measure ¹ de…ned as follows: For all i 2f 1;2;:::;kg;
and for all Borel subset A ½ R;
¹(i;A)=¹i(A);
where ¹i is the measure induced by Qi on R: One shot experimentation of n players
will be represented by a member of En: We will equip En with the product measure
arising from ¹: Let Hm be the set of histories at the beginning of period m: Hence,
Hm = En(m¡1): Let H1 be de…ned as ?: A player i’s strategy at period m, ¿i
m; is a
measurable mapping from Hm into ¢; where ¢ is the (k ¡1)-dimensional simplex
with a measure induced from Lebesgue measure on Rk¡1:




pi =1 ;p j ¸ 0 for all j =1 ;2;:::;kg:
A pure strategy of player i at period m is a player i’s strategy which maps Hm
into vertices of ¢: A strategy of player i ¿i =( ¿i
1;¿i
2;:::) is de…ned as a collection
of player i’s strategies at each period. ¿i is a pure strategy if all the ¿i
m are pure.
A strategy pro…le ¿ =( ¿1;:::;¿n) is a collection of strategies of all the players, and
it is pure if all the ¿i are pure. Following convention, we will use the notation
¿ =( ¿i;¿¡i) to decompose ¿ into player i’s strategy and all the other players’
strategies. Let T be the set of strategies of each player. Hence, T n will be the set
of all the strategy pro…les.
Let Zi
m be the realized payo¤ of player i at period m; which will depend on
95the strategy pro…le the players are adopting. Suppose for the time being that ¿ is
a pure strategy pro…le. Then, Zi


















w h e r ea sa na b u s eo fn o t a t i o n ,w eu s e¿i
m(Z1;:::;Z m¡1) to denote player i’s selection
at period m; which could be justi…ed by the observation that, given ¿;knowing all
t h ev a l u e so f(Z1;:::;Zm¡1) is equivalent to knowing the history at period m: From
the de…nition, it is clear that Zi
m is dependent on ¿: For notational convenience,
however, we will suppress the dependence of Zi
m on ¿ as long as there is no risk of









where A =( a1;® 2;:::) is the sequence of discount factors and the subscript ¿ repre-
sents the dependence of the expectation on ¿:The above de…nition will generalize
to the case when ¿ is not pure. If ¿ is not a pure strategy pro…le, then it will be a
mixture of pure strategy pro…les. The payo¤ will be then the average of the each
payo¤ from the constituting pure strategy pro…les.
964.3 Best Responses
Let G be the common prior that the players have at the beginning of the













Assumption 4.1 Each element ®m of the discount sequence A is nonnegative,
and
P1
m=1 ®m < 1:
Assumption 4.2 Each component Qi of (Q1;Q 2;:::;Qk) 2D k has …nite …rst
absolute moment with G-probability one, and that this moment has …nite G-
expectation.
The previous assumptions guarantee that V i(G;¿¡i) is bounded for all G and
¿¡i:6 To further our analysis, we need one more technical result. Since the players
keep updating their beliefs as they get to observe the experimentations at each
period, we want this updating process measurable. A modi…cation of Theorem
V.8.1 in Parthasarathy (1967) and Lemma 2.2.1 in Berry and Fristedt (1985) will
give us what we need. Since we are using D(Dk) as the set of state variables, all
of these technicalities are unavoidable.
6 This could be proved in a similar way as Theorem 2.5.1 is proved in Berry and Fristedt (1985).
97Proposition 4.3 For all c =( c1;:::;cn) 2f 1;2;:::;kgn; there exists a measur-























the outcome: We will denote the common random posterior at the beginning of
period 2 as G(1);j; where superscript j indicates that player i selected j-th option







































Now we will de…ne the best response correspondence of player i:















98Lemma 4.5 Player i’s best response correspondence Bi is non-empty for all
¿¡i 2 Tn¡1 and for all i:
Proof . We will construct ^ ¿
i 2 Bi(¿¡i) by induction as follows. Let ^ ¿
i
1(?) be


























where the subscript ^ ¿ indicates that the expectation is dependent on ^ ¿
i
1 and ¿¡i:
After G(n) and ^ ¿
i
n are de…ned, ^ ¿
i



























T h ea r g u m e n ti ss t a n d a r da n dw ew i l lo m i tt h ed e t a i l . 7
We used the …niteness of the set of the alternatives in the proof of Lemma
4.5 in an essential way. As a matter of fact, if the set of the alternatives is not
…nite, optimal policies may not exist. Indeed, Easley and Kiefer (1989) shows that
if the set of alternatives are uncountable, optimal policies may not exist even in
7 For example, see p.44, Berry and Fristedt (1985).
99one-player case.
In the proof of Proposition 4.5, we constructed a best response which is a
pure strategy. Hence,
Proposition 4.6 Against every ¿¡i 2 Tn¡1; there exists at least one pure
strategy best response for player i.
4.4 Value Functions
In general, player i’s value function V i(G;¿¡i) is not a continuous function
in G:8 In the following special case, however, V i(G;¿¡i) will be continuous in G:






















where fc is the function de…ned in Proposition 4.3, the summations are taken over





c ®c =1 : If ®n
c ! ®c as n !1for








8 See Example 2.5.1 in Berry and Fristedt (1985).
100as n !1 :
















































Hence, it is clear that ®n
c ! ®c for all c implies that V i(G(1);n;¿¡i) ! V i(G(1);¿¡i):
Now we turn to the set of strategies. Given ¿ =( ¿1;¿2;:::) and ¿0 =
(¿0
1;¿0
2;:::); recall that ¿m and ¿0
m are Rk valued measurable functions. The distance
between ¿m and ¿0
m;d m(¿m;¿0









where ¿m;j and ¿0
m;j are j-th coordinate of ¿m and ¿0
m; respectively. Next, we will










Therefore, d(¿n;¿) ! 0 as n ! 0 is equivalent to L1 convergence of each compo-
nent of ¿n to the corresponding component of ¿: If ¿n
m ! ¿m in L1; there exists a
101subsequence of ¿n
m which will converge to ¿m almost surely. Therefore, ¿m will also
be a strategy at period m: From this observation, it is clear that T is a complete
metric space. For strategy pro…les ¿;^ ¿ 2Tn¡1( or T n ), we will use the product









Changes in ¿¡i do not have direct e¤ects on the instant payo¤ of player i at
each stage; since ¿¡i only determines the law by which player i will obtain extra
information. Thus, we would conjecture that the value function of player i is a
continuous function of ¿¡i: T h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m as h o w st h a tt h i sc o n j e c t u r ei st r u e .
Lemma 4.8 For …xed G; V i(G;¢) is a continuous function.














We will …rst show that for all A; and for all n<1;Vi(G;¿¡i;A(n)) is continuous
in ¿¡i uniformly in G: We prove this by induction. For n =1 ; the optimal strategy








¯ ¯ =0for all G;¿
¡i;^ ¿
¡i;A:
Suppose that it is true for all 1 · k · n; and for all A that V i(G;¿¡i;A(k)) is
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
:
The …rst term in the right hand side of the inequality will be arbitrarily
small by induction hypothesis if ^ ¿
¡i is close enough to ¿¡i.A sG(1);j and ^ G(1);j are
posteriors from the same prior G; we can apply Lemma 4.7, and hence, the last
term will also be arbitrarily small if ^ ¿

































As V i(G;¿¡i;A(n)) ! V i(G;¿¡i) uniformly in ¿¡i; 9 by choosing n appropriately,
the …rst and the last term can be made less than "=3 for all ">0.G i v e nt h a tn
and "; by continuity of V i(G;¢;A(n)); the middle term will be less than "=3 if ^ ¿
¡i
9 See Theorem 2.5.1 in Berry and Fristedt (1985).
103is close enough to ¿¡i:
4.5 Existence of Pure Markov Strategy
Equilibria
For hm 2H m; let Ghm be the posterior belief at the beginning of stage m: A
strategy ¿ =( ¿1;¿2;:::) 2T is a Markov strategy if there exists ~ ¿ : D(Dk) ! ¢
such that ¿m(hm)=~ ¿(Ghm) for all hm 2H m; and m: Thus, if player i is adopting
a Markov strategy, then his selection will depend only on the posterior at that
s t a g e .A sl o n ga st h ep o s t e r i o r sa r et h es a m e ,r e g a r d l e s so ft h et i m eh ei sg o i n gt o
make a choice and the history before the stage, his selection will be the same. A
Markov strategy ~ ¿ is a pure Markov strategy if ~ ¿ maps D(Dk) into vertices of ¢:
In this section, we will provide the main result of this chapter: There exist
pure Markov strategy Equilibria in multi-player multi-armed bandit problems. In
order to invoke the usual …xed point theorem, we will show that the set of pure
Markov strategies is compact subset of the set of strategies. Then, it will be
shown that the best response correspondence restricted on the set of pure Markov
strategies is non-empty, convex, and upper semi-continuous. Recall that, given a












We say that Ak ! A if limsupAk = liminf Ak
Lemma 4.9 M is a compact subset of T .
Proof . Since T is a complete metric space, it su¢ces to show that M is
sequentially compact. That is, it su¢ces to show that for every sequence f~ ¿ng½
M, there exists a subsequence of f~ ¿ng that converges in M.N o t e t h a t a p u r e







where the ej are unit vectors in Rk; and the Gn
j a r et h ei n v e r s ei m a g e so fej by ~ ¿n:
By de…nition, [Gn
j = D(Dk) and Gn
i \ Gn
j = ? for i 6= j:
Let
G1 =l i ms u pG
n
1
and select a subsequence f~ ¿nlgof f~ ¿ng such that G
nl
1 ! G1 as l !1 : Given f~ ¿nlg;
let’s de…ne G2 as
G2 =l i ms u pG
nl
2 ;
and select a subsequence f~ ¿nlkgof f~ ¿nlg such that G
nlk
2 ! G2 as k !1 : Repeat
this process until we have subsequence f~ ¿nqgof f~ ¿ng such that G
nq
j ! Gj ½D (Dk)





Then, by construction, ~ ¿ is a random variable. Since fGjg are disjoint, ~ ¿ is a
Markov strategy.
In the remainder, we will consider a modi…ed game of the original multi-
player multi-armed bandit problems. In this modi…ed game, the set of strategies
of the players are restricted to M. P a y o ¤ sw i l lb ed e t e r m i n e da si nt h eo r i g i n a l
game. Let ^ Bi be player i’s best response in the modi…ed game. We could prove
that ^ Bi is non-empty as in Lemma 4.5. The proof of Lemma 4.5 will go through
without much change. As the strategies are stationary, it is obvious that ^ Bi(¿¡i)
is convex for every ¿¡i 2M n¡1: We already showed that M is compact. What
remains to be shown is the following. Recall that a correspondence ¡:X ! 2Y
is called upper semicontinuous if fx :¡ ( x) ½ Wg is open in X for every open
W ½ Y:
Lemma 4.10 Player i’s best response correspondence ^ Bi is upper semicontin-
uous.
Proof . By Theorem 7.1.14 in Klein and Thompson (1984), it su¢ces to show
that ^ Bi is upper hemicontinuous and ^ Bi(¿¡i) is compact for every ¿¡i 2M n¡1:












We have to show that
¿
i 2 ^ B
i(¿
¡i);






























m): Also, by Lemma
4.8, V i(G;¿¡i;n) ! V i(G;¿¡i): Thus, ^ Bi(¿¡i) is upper hemicontinuous.
For compactness of ^ Bi(¿¡i); as M is compact, we have only to show that
^ Bi(¿¡i) is closed. Suppose that ¿i;n 2 ^ Bi(¿¡i) and ¿i;n ! ¿i: It is immediate that





























For proof, it su¢ces to show that ^ B has a …xed point. Since the ^ Bi are non-empty,
and convex, ^ B will also be non-empty, and convex. It is clear that ^ B is also upper
semicontinuous, as ^ Bi is upper semicontinuous. It is obvious that ^ B is closed. As
Mn is compact and convex, by Theorem 11.4 in Dugundji and Granas (1982), ^ B
has a …xed point.
108Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we investigated various situations of strategic experimen-
tation. All these models, however, share one common feature: Players can observe
perfectly others’ actions and payo¤s. We should point out that there is some liter-
ature on strategic experimentation with di¤erent assumptions. Most well known is
the literature on herding. In the study of herd behavior, it is assumed that people
can observe what others are doing, but not their payo¤s. Under this assumption,
players have private information, and they can only infer information about the
respective payo¤s of others from observed actions.
We believe that our world is somewhere in between these two extreme cases.
If so, we will have another dimension of strategic behavior, and a lot of intriguing
questions. How much information should I collect? How much information should
109I release? If I have some control over the quality of the released information, when
should I release truth and when should I release forged information? All of these
q u e s t i o n sa r ew a i t i n gt ob ea n s w e r e d .
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